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Abstract 
Earlier, cases of drunken driving resulting in an accident 
were determined in accordance with sections 337 and 338 
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). Relatively lenient, 
these provisions warrant maximum punishments of 
imprisonment for 6 months and 2 years respectively. 
However the Supreme Court in Alister Anthony Pareira v. 
State of Maharashtra1 held that in a case where an 
allegation is raised regarding an accident being caused as 
a consequence of drunkenness, the investigating agency is 
bound to register the case under section of 304, IPC. 
Section 304 part II deals with culpable homicide not 
amounting to murder, and imposes a punishment of 10 
years rigorous imprisonment. As a result, drunken 
driving has now been made punishable under section 304 
part II as well as under sections 337 and 338, which deal 
with injury caused by negligence. The objective of this 
study is to provide a critical commentary of the 
aforementioned judgment. 
Keywords: Accident, Accused, Attributed Knowledge, Drunken 
Driving, res ipsa loquitur. 
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The World Health Organisation in its Global Status Report on Road 
Safety, 2012 has pointed out that speeding and drunken driving are 
two major contributing factors in road accidents. According to the 
National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), the number of deaths 
caused by road accidents in India every year exceeds 1,35,000.2  The 
NCRB Report also cites drunken driving as a major reason for road 
accidents. Cases of drunken driving have increased exponentially 
in recent years. Through proper trial and sentencing procedures, 
the judiciary can effectively deter and thereby restrict such cases of 
gross negligence.  
Section 304, IPC - Punishment for Culpable Homicide Not 
Amounting to Murder 
This section deals with the punishment for acts of negligence which 
the person knows is likely to cause death, but which are committed 
without an intention to cause death. The maximum term of 
imprisonment imposed under this section is 10 years. Punishment 
under the second part of section 304 would require the accused to 
have sufficient knowledge of the incident, whereas under the first 
part of the same Section, one needs to prove intention to cause 
death and bodily injury 
Section 337 and Section 338 – Causing (Grievous) Hurt by 
Negligent Act 
Section 337, IPC, provides for punishment for causing hurt by an 
act that endangers the life or personal safety of others. In this 
regard, the impugned act must be proved to be either rash or 
negligent. The punishment for this offence is a maximum 
imprisonment for 6 months and/or fine of Rs. 500. Section 338 is 
stricter, and deals with punishment for causing grievous hurt by a 
negligent act.  The maximum punishment as stipulated under this 
                                                          
2 Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India, 2012, National Crime Records 
Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, available at http://ncrb.gov.in/CD-
ADSI-2012/ADSIHome2012.htm. (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).  
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provision is imprisonment for two years and/or fine of Rs. 1000. 
The burden of proof is generally on the prosecution, but in some 
cases the court shifts the onus onto the accused. This is done using 
the principle of res ipsa loquitur, where the accident or act speaks for 
itself.  
Brief Facts and Procedural History 
On Carter Road, Bandra (West), Mumbai in the early hours of 
November 12, 2006 between 3.45 - 4.00 a.m., a car ran into a 
pavement killing seven persons and causing injuries to eight 
persons. The appellant, Alister Anthony Pareira was driving the car 
bearing registration number MH-01-R-580, with the knowledge 
that people were asleep on the footpath. He rammed the car over 
the pavement, thereby causing the death of seven persons and 
injuring eight others. The appellant was found to have been in an 
inebriated state at the time the accident occurred, but the 
prosecution did not press charges against him in this regard. A 
First Information Report (FIR) was registered under sections 304, 
279, 336, 337, 338 and 427 of the IPC, section 185 of the Motor 
Vehicles Act, 1988 IPC and section 66(1)(b) of the Bombay 
Prohibition Act, 1949. On completion of the investigation, the 
charge sheet was filed under sections 304 part II and section 338 of 
the IPC. The prosecution, to prove the above charges against the 
appellant, tendered oral and documentary evidence, and examined 
a total of eighteen witnesses. The appellant admitted that he was 
driving the car at the relevant time and the accident did occur, but 
his explanation was that it happened on account of an engine 
failure and other mechanical defects. He denied there being any 
negligence on his part. 
The trial court convicted the appellant for offences punishable 
under sections 304A and 337 of the IPC. The court sentenced him to 
simple imprisonment of six months with a fine of Rs. 5 lakhs for the 
offence under section 304A IPC, and simple imprisonment of 15 
days for the offence under section 337 IPC. Both the sentences were 
ordered to run concurrently.  
The state of Maharashtra preferred a criminal appeal challenging 
the acquittal of the appellant under the section 304 part II, and 
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section 338. The state of Maharashtra preferred another criminal 
appeal, seeking an enhancement of the sentence awarded to the 
appellant by the trial court for the offences under sections 304A and 
337. The appellant also preferred a criminal appeal to set aside the 
judgment and order dated April 13, 2007 passed by the trial court 
convicting him under section 304A and 337 of the IPC. 
All the appeals were heard together by the High Court of Bombay 
and were disposed of on September 6, 2007. The High Court set 
aside the acquittal of the appellant under section 304 and convicted 
him for the offences under section 304 part II and section 337. The 
High Court sentenced the appellant to undergo rigorous 
imprisonment for three years for the offence punishable under 
section 304 part II, and imposed a fine of Rs. 5 lakhs on him. In 
respect of the offence under section 338, the appellant was 
sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a term of one year. 
For the offence under section 337, a simple imprisonment for six 
months was imposed on him. The appellant preferred an appeal to 
the Supreme Court, challenging the decision of the Bombay High 
Court. 
Issues Involved 
Whether the Charges under Sections 304 Part II and 338, IPC can 
Co-exist in a Single Case of Rash or Negligent Act? 
Under section 304 part II, the knowledge of the accused about the 
likelihood of his acts causing death is important. Courts have, in 
many cases, attributed reasonable knowledge as a precondition to 
convict an accused. On the other hand, sections 337 and 338 of the 
IPC make a negligent act punishable regardless of the knowledge 
of the accused. These offences are made punishable because of the 
inherent danger of the acts in question.  
In Empress of India v. Idu Beg,3 the court explained the meaning of 
criminal rashness and criminal negligence. It explained criminal 
rashness as hazarding a dangerous act done with the knowledge 
that it may cause injury but without the intention to cause injury, or 
knowledge that injury will probably be caused. The criminality lies 
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in running the risk of committing such an act with recklessness or 
indifference as to the consequences. With regard to the indictment 
of the accused under sections 304 part II and section 338, the court 
held that the charges could co-exist in a single case of rash or 
negligent act.  
Whether Prosecution’s Omission to Charge the Appellant for 
‘Drunken Condition’ was Prejudicial to the Appellant?  
The phrase ‘drunken condition’ was not mentioned in the charge 
sheet against the accused. The appellant claimed that this omission 
in the prosecution’s case caused serious prejudice to the appellant. 
The court discussed section 464 (i) of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973 which states that an order of a court shall not be 
deemed invalid merely on the ground of any error, omission or 
irregularity in the charge, unless it results in injustice. The case of 
Anna Reddy Sambasiva Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh4 came up for 
reference, where the court had observed that a fair trial is a sine qua 
non in our criminal justice system and every case must depend on 
its own merits and that a straightjacket formula cannot be applied. 
Here, the essential element was whether the omission to frame a 
specific charge had resulted in prejudice to the accused.  
The ingredients of section 304 part II IPC are implicit in the charge 
against the accused. The witness statements adduced by the 
prosecution clearly demonstrated that the appellant was fully 
aware of the prosecution’s evidence relating to his rash and 
negligent driving in an intoxicated state. The court held that the 
provisions of section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 
(CrPC) had been fairly, or at least substantially, complied with by 
the trial court in this case. Thus, it was determined that the 
prosecution’s omission did not result in any prejudice to the 
appellant and therefore the trial and conviction of the appellant 
was valid. 
                                                          
4 Anna Reddy Sambasiva Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 2009 
S.C. 2661. 
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Whether it was Established beyond Reasonable Doubt that the 
Appellant had the Knowledge as Required under Section 304 Part 
II? 
The spot panchnama showed brake marks stretching for 70 feet 
along a curve in the road. This shows that the vehicle the appellant 
was driving his vehicle at a very high speed when he lost control. 
The car climbed on to the footpath and ran over the persons 
sleeping there. The court noted that in Mumbai, people do, in fact, 
sleep on pavements.5  
Against the backdrop of the above findings, the court concluded 
that the accused could be attributed to have specific knowledge of 
the event that occurred. The evidence and materials on record 
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the knowledge that his act 
(driving the vehicle at a high speed in a rash or negligent manner) 
was dangerous could be attributed to the appellant. In this respect, 
there is a presumption that a man knows the natural and likely 
consequences of his acts.  
Whether the Punishment Awarded by the High Court Required 
Modification? 
The counsel for the appellant argued in favour of mitigating the 
punishment based on an extenuating circumstance of him being the 
breadwinner of his family. In response to this, the court referred to 
the case of Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana,6 wherein the court was 
decidedly opposed to showing any leniency to drivers who were 
guilty of rash and negligent driving, on the ostensible reasoning 
that harsh punishments would create a deterrent effect in society. 
In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem,7 the court stated that undue 
sympathy against imposing an adequate sentence would harm the 
justice system by undermining the public confidence in the efficacy 
of law. 
In the instant case, the Court, while deciding on the proportionate 
punishment, observed that seven human lives were lost by the act 
of the accused. The Supreme Court observed that under such 
                                                          
5 Empress of India v. Idu Beg, 1881 (3) All. 776. 
6 Dalbir Singh, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1677. 
7 Saleem, 2005 (5) S.C.C. 554. 
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circumstances, imprisonment of three years is too meager a 
punishment.  In view of the gravity of the crime, the Court refused 
to reduce the sentence, and thus, the punishment awarded by the 
Bombay High Court was accepted by the Supreme Court as well.   
Critical Analysis of the Judgment 
What Constitutes Grievous Injury? 
In the instant case, the Court had to deal with many intricacies and 
contentious points of law. By acquitting the accused under section 
338, IPC, the trial court failed to understand the injury caused by 
the negligence of the accused. Section 338 imposes a punishment 
for causing grievous hurt by any act endangering life or personal 
safety of others. The reckless driving of the accused caused injuries 
to seven innocent civilians. In the trial court’s opinion, this did not 
constitute grievous hurt. Such an interpretation results in grave 
injustice to the victims. In the case of Jassa Singh v. State of Haryana8 
it was held that offences committed under the circumstances which 
may reasonably cause an apprehension of death or grievous hurt as 
its consequence, would invoke criminal liability under section 338, 
IPC. The High Court rightly overruled the judgment of the trial 
court and recognized the injuries as grievous and held the accused 
guilty under section 338 as well.  
Attributed Knowledge 
In Hanuman v. State of Haryana9, the Supreme Court held that 
attributed knowledge is necessary to convict an accused under 
section 304 part II of the IPC. The most contentious point in similar 
cases is whether the accused has the requisite knowledge, and to 
what extent that knowledge can be attributed to a person’s act. A 
person is generally presumed to know the reasonable consequences 
of his act, and cannot claim that he had no knowledge regarding 
the obvious consequences of the same. In this case, the accused was 
unable to prove the absence of knowledge. He was a resident of the 
area where the accident occurred, and was fully aware of the fact 
that labourers were sleeping on the footpath. Despite this, he 
                                                          
8 Jassa, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 520. 
9 Hanuman, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1302. 
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recklessly and negligently drove his car at a high speed, losing 
control over the vehicle. 
In Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi Administration)10 the court attributed 
knowledge to the accused as he wielded a knife and knew that he 
was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death. In Joti 
Parshad v. State of Haryana,11 the court, taking into consideration 
that counterfeit stamps were recovered from the appellant, 
concluded that the appellant had knowledge or reason to believe 
that the stamps which he had been selling were counterfeit, and 
accordingly found him guilty. Taking into consideration the above 
cases and arguments, the researcher believes that the trial court had 
erred in acquitting the accused from the charge under section 304 
part II. However the High Court corrected this decision, stating 
that it was reasonably foreseeable that such sheer negligence could 
result in serious injury.  
Can Sections 304 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 Co-exist? 
The main argument on behalf of the appellant was that sections 304 
part II and section 338 of the IPC are mutually inconsistent and 
legally untenable. Usually, cases of drunken driving are charged 
under sections 337 and 338 which do not require any knowledge 
but only a mere negligent act on the part of the accused. However, 
in the instant case, the accused was charged under section 304 part 
II.  The question to be answered here is whether a person can be 
charged under both the provisions for a single act? In other words, 
can a person commit a single act, both with and without 
knowledge? The court, in this particular case, answered these 
questions in the affirmative and held that sections 338 and 304 can 
co-exist. The researcher agrees with this view. The crux of the 
court’s ruling in this regard was that if an accident resulting in 
death arises out of drunken driving of the accused, he can be 
charged under section 304 part II of IPC and can also be held liable 
separately for the grossly negligent act of drunken driving itself. 
While deciding on any particular case, the court must to look into 
the social aspects of the issue. This is especially so where road 
                                                          
10 Jai Prakash, (1991) 1 S.C.R. 202. 
11 Joti Parshad, 1993 Supp. (2) S.C.C. 497. 
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accidents are concerned because they have emerged as a major 
concern in society. Hence, any instance of negligence or reckless 
driving must be dealt with harshly. The errant driver cannot claim 
that he had no knowledge that his negligence could result in an 
accident, or lead to the death of others. Drunken driving is an 
extreme form of negligent conduct and the accused should be 
charged under the strictest possible legal provision, in this case, 
section 304 part II of the IPC. 
Does Mere Irregularity in the Charge Sheet Invalidate Court 
Proceedings? 
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973 casts a 
duty on the court to put to the accused each material circumstance 
appearing in the evidence, specifically, distinctly and separately. A 
failure to do so amounts to a serious irregularity which vitiates the 
trial, provided it is shown that the accused was prejudiced as a 
consequence.12 At the same time, the provisions contained in the 
Code of Criminal Procedure are designed to further the ends of 
justice and not to frustrate them by the introduction of 
technicalities. Hence, section 464 of CrPC states that a court order 
shall not be deemed invalid merely on the ground of omission or 
irregularity in the charge sheet. 
 In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra13 the court 
observed that an omission in the charge sheet does not ipso facto 
vitiate the proceedings, and that the prejudice claimed to be 
occasioned by such defect must be established by the accused. Thus 
the burden of proof is on the accused to show that the omission 
was prejudicial to his case. In Jai Dev v. State of Punjab14, the 
Supreme Court observed that the ultimate test in determining 
whether or not the accused has been fairly examined under section 
342 would be to enquire whether, having regard to all the questions 
put to him, he was given an opportunity to make his submissions 
in respect of the prosecution’s case against him. In William Slaney v. 
                                                          
12 Asraf Ali v. State of Assam, (2008) 16 S.C.C. 328. 
13 Shivaji Sahabrao, 1973 (2) S.C.C. 793. 
14 Jai Dev, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 612. 
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State of Madhya Pradesh15 the court held that framing charges under 
a different legislative provision is illegal and renders the trial 
invalid, but mere omission is a curable irregularity which does not 
render the proceedings invalid unless prejudice caused against the 
accused, is proved. 
 In Gurbachan Singh v. State of Punjab,16 it was held that in judging a 
question of prejudice, courts must look into the substance and not 
the technicalities, and the main concern should be whether the 
accused was afforded a fair trial, whether he knew what he was 
being tried for, whether the main facts sought to be established 
against him were explained to him clearly, and whether he was 
given a fair chance to defend himself. In the present case the 
accused was made aware of all the prosecution evidence regarding 
his drunken condition that was placed before him and was 
afforded a full opportunity to defend himself. Hence, the court was 
right in holding that the omission to charge him for ‘drunken 
condition’ was a mere irregularity and the proceedings and the 
judgment stands valid.  
The court in the instant case examined whether negligence was 
sufficiently established, and on whom the burden of proof shall lie. 
Normally, it is for the prosecution to prove negligence, but in some 
cases courts rely on the rule of res ipsa loquitur to shift the burden of 
proof to the accused. The Supreme Court recognized this rule in the 
case of Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing 
Co. P. Ltd.17 by holding that the rule of res ipsa loquitur ought to be 
used in exceptional cases where the plaintiff can prove the 
occurrence of the accident but cannot establish negligence on the 
part of the defendant. The phrase res ipsa loquitur means that an act 
(in this case, the accident) speaks for itself or tells its own story. 
This rule was also accepted in Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab18. In 
cases of obvious negligence as these, the rule of res ipsa loquitur 
merits recognition, and must be given due credit. 
                                                          
15 William Slaney, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 116. 
16 Gurbachan Singh v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 623. 
17 Pushpabai, (1977) 3 S.C.R. 372. 
18 Thakur Singh, (2003) 9 S.C.C 208. 




The Supreme Court, while discussing the legal issues involved in 
the case, referred to many different precedents, and made many 
insightful observations. The researcher feels that while the trial 
court’s judgment was flawed in some aspects, the High Court and 
Supreme Court corrected the flaws and came up with a well 
reasoned and cogent judgment. In this regard, the court shall seek 
to strike a delicate balance between the rights of the accused and 
those of the victim while deciding on the proportionate quantum of 
punishment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
